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Abstract—Cognitive Radio is considered as a promising and 
demanding technology to examine whether a particular radio 
spectrum band is currently in use or not and to switch into the 
temporarily unoccupied spectrum band in order to improve 
the usage of the radio electromagnetic spectrum without 
creating interference to the transmissions of other users. 
Because of the dynamic properties of CRNs, the issue of 
supporting secure communication in CRNs becomes more 
critical than that of other conventional wireless networks. In 
this paper, we propose  a combination of certificate-based trust 
with a behavior-based trust which will benefit both by 
representing the trust as certificates in the the predeployment 
trust relation and by providing a continuous behaviour-based 
evalution of trust.  
Keywords- Trust, primary user, secondary user, security, 
cognitive radio networks,  radio. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Due to the increasing demand for new wireless services 
and applications, Cognitive Radio (CR) has offered a 
promising concept for improving the consumption of limited 
radio spectrum resources for future wireless communications 
and mobile computing [13].  The primary objective of 
Cognitive Radio Networks is to scan the spectrum and 
identity free channels which will be used for opportunistic 
transmission. Sometimes, several frequency bands are not 
used according to their maximum level. These under-utilized 
areas are known as spectrum holes or white spaces [1]. So, 
CRs offer a solution for the scarcity of spectrum by reusing 
the under-utilized spectrum. National regulatory bodies like 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) assign 
spectrum for particular types of services that are then 
licensed to bidders for a fee [2]. CR, pioneered by Mitola [3] 
from software defined radio (SDR), was mainly considered 
to make a better utilization of spectrum. CR, on the other 
hand, takes place above the SDR and is the “intelligence” 
that lets an SDR determine which mode of operation and 
parameters to use [23]. We can obtain an overview of CR 
functionalities from Haykins’s definition of cognitive radio 
[4]: “Cognitive radio is an intelligent wireless 
communication system that is aware of its surrounding 
environment (i.e., outside world), and uses the methodology 
of understandings-by-building to learn from the environment 
and adapt its internal states to statistical variations in the 
incoming RF stimuli by making corresponding changes in 
certain operating parameters (e.g., transmit power, carries-
frequency, and modulation strategy) in real time, with two 
primary objectives in mind: highly reliable communication 
whenever and wherever needed, efficient utilization of the 
radio spectrum”. CR has two main properties: Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) and Dynamic Spectrum Access (DNS) [5]. 
AI involves reasoning and learning. This gives CR its 
‘intelligent’ characteristics and allows it to learn about its 
changing environment. DNS refers to the processes involved 
in getting a CR to detect and occupy a vacant spectrum. It 
involves spectrum sensing, spectrum management, spectrum 
mobility and spectrum sharing.  Generally, there are two 
types of users in CR: the primary user (PU) is a licensed user 
of a particular radio frequency band [6]; and the secondary 
user (SU) is an unlicensed user who operates in a cognitive 
way without making harmful interference to the primary user 
[6]. Since cognitive radios can adapt to their radio 
environment and has ability to change how they 
communicate, so it is critical that they choose optimal and 
secure communications. The unique characteristics of CRNs 
make security more challenging [13]. Still, there are some 
crucial issues which have not been investigated in the area of 
security for cognitive radio networks. When a CR node 
initially tries to form a CRN, or tries to connect a node which 
is intended to join an existing CRN, it is practically quite 
impossible to implement conventional security functions as 
CRNs have resource constraints such as power and memory 
[24]. The common public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme 
which achieves secure routing and other purposes in typical 
ad-hoc networks is not enough to guarantee the security for 
CRNs under limited communication and computation 
resources [24]. Even the various encryption techniques such 
as public key encryption (RSA, Elliptic, SHA) and private 
key encryption (DES, Triple DES, AES) algorithms can be 
used in CRNs to provide a form of secure communication 
[21].  All of these encryption algorithms need to make sure 
that the key that is used at the transmitter side should be 
provided by the receiver for correct informational retrieval 
thereby ensuring the security and also preventing any 
malicious users from taking control of the system and 
blocking other secondary users’ access [21]. Therefore, 
CRNs require a trusted mechanism, while authentication is a 
component of trust along with other technical or non-
technical factors. To ensure the smooth and normal operation 
of CRNs, trust forms the foundation of the security platform 
of CRNs with a view to support ubiquitous and mobile 
computing. However, trust for CRNs is quite different from 
that of other wireless scenarios and in other areas of 
computing trust. Trust is critical in CRNs’ operation and is 
beyond security design since security usually needs 
communication overhead advance [9]. So in this paper, we 
propose a combinational approach to establish trust in 
cognitive radio networks (CRNs) in order to ensure security 
in communication. 
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, related 
works is reviewed. In Section 3, we describe the basics of 
trust. In Section 4, we describe our proposed scheme which 
combines a certificate-based and behavior-based trust 
scheme. We conclude the paper in Section 5 including 
remarks on future directions.  
II. RELATED WORKS 
It is mentioned that trust has been widely mentioned in 
the existing literatures in relation to trusted computing and 
web computing, ad hoc networks and even social science [8]. 
To ensure the smooth operation of CRNs to support 
ubiquitous and mobile computing, establishing trust for 
CRNs is an open and challenging issue.  However, trust for 
CRNs is completely different from trust in these other 
aspects and scenarios. Trust is critical in CRNs operation and 
beyond security design, as security usually needs 
communication overhead in advance [9]. The authors in [9] 
describe the trust in CRN as an essential component of 
CRNs. 
The authors in [10] proposed a Markov chain-based trust 
model has been proposed for analyzing trust value in 
distributed multicasting mobile ad hoc networks. They also 
proposed the approach for selecting the Certificate Authority 
(CA) and Backup CA (BCA) [10]. Essential and important 
considerations for developing a good trust management 
system for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been 
proposed in [18]. The impact of trust model in CRNs is 
discussed briefly in [11]. Parvin et al. [22] proposed trust-
based security for cognitive radio networks. They presented 
a trust-based matrix for calculating trust value, but they did 
not show the evaluation process in detail. The authors in [12] 
integrated trust and reputation for the threat mitigation of 
Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) attack on 
CRNs.  However, they did not propose any trust modeling 
for CRNs. The authors suggested potential ways for applying 
trust modeling to CRNs including identity management, the 
trust building process and possible mechanisms for 
disseminating the trust information [11]. Furthermore, no 
experimental results were established to support these 
discussions. A trust-aware model was proposed for spectrum 
sensing in CRNs but the authors fail to evaluate the system 
[13]. A Trust Value Updated Model (TVUM) is proposed in 
layered and grouped ad-hoc network for ensuring the 
authentication [14].  In this paper, we propose a 
combinational trust-establishment approach for secure 
communication in CRNs. 
III. TRUST IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWWORKS 
Some nodes in Cognitive Radio Networks become 
compromised and cause harm to the open and shared 
wireless networks. Current research is concerned with 
detecting these malicious harmful nodes and finding a means 
to exclude them from the network. In this paper, our 
intension is to establish the effectiveness of trust in this 
regard. In a trust-based CRNs model, the main objectives of 
trust are to manage the CR nodes in a dynamic manner and 
the cognitive radio nodes’ activity is monitored and 
evaluated effectively in a distributed manner. Based on the 
trust evaluation model, malicious nodes are detected and 
listed in a blacklist so that they cannot take part further in 
any communication within the network community.  
Therefore, trust-establishment for evaluating trust is 
beneficial for secure communication in CRNs. 
A. Definition of Trust  
According to [15], trust is a mutual relationship between 
two parties so that one party can believe, expect, and accept 
that the other trusted party will act or intend to act 
accordingly. Based on our CRNs working principles, we 
express trust as a representation of the degree to which a 
cognitive radio node would communicate with other 
cognitive radio nodes in a trustworthy, secure, or reliable 
way. There are various ways to measure the trust value and 
we represent the trust by symbol T .  In our cognitive radio 
network model, when a secondary user represents 
trustworthiness enough for a primary user and satisfies the 
basic trust requirements, only then the secondary user can 
obtain access to the free spectrum of the primary user and 
participate in the communication initiated by that secondary 
user.  
B. Trust Establishment in CRNs 
There are two different ways to establish trust in CRNs.  
• Certificate –based Trust Establishment 
Certificate-based trust establishment is a traditional and 
the most widely used approach. A public key infrastructure 
model is used to set up the Certificate Authority (CA) in this 
framework. Three standard approaches have been proposed 
in [15] for establishing certificate-based trust.  These three 
approaches are different from each other based on the 
architecture. Among these three approaches, two are based 
on hierarchical architecture and one is on distributed 
architecture.  In hierarchical-based approach, the trusted 
third party is responsible for the evaluation of trust by using 
signed certificates. A self-organized public key management 
scheme is used in the second approach, where certificate 
chains are used to evaluate trust value.  In the third approach, 
secret key sharing mechanisms play an important role to 
circulate the trust to an aggregation of nodes which is able to 
provide continuous services to CA.  
• Behavior –based Trust Establishment 
In the behavior-based trust model, trust is considered as 
the degree of positive cooperation and behaviors between 
surrounding CR nodes in the CRNs. Trust is evaluated in 
both independent and cooperative manner. In an independent 
manner, trust is evaluated by every CR node using local 
observations and statistical data that is integrated by 
continuous monitoring the traffic of cognitive radio network. 
However, in a cooperative manner, trust is evaluated by 
sharing recommendations with neighboring nodes and 
distributing reputation among neighboring nodes.  The main 
purpose of the behavior-based trust model is to detect the 
malicious CR nodes, isolate them in order to protect 
resources of the network, by assigning a low trust value and  
sending a recommendation to other nodes not to establish 
any further communication  with the malicious CR nodes .  
When trust is evaluated independently, it is called ‘direct 
trust’.  In ‘direct trust’, the evaluation is based on the direct 
communication and experience that the trustor CR node has 
on the trustee CR node. Mechanisms of collecting evidences 
usually take place under the application layer, in order to 
measure the evaluation of routing behaviors and information 
of integrity [16].  For example, the radio in every CR node 
always needs to be activated, while the trust values of all 
neighboring nodes in the network are required to be stored 
and updated continuously whenever interactions take place 
in the network. 
‘Indirect’ trust is measured according to the 
recommendations from other nodes about the target node.  
The derivation procedure of indirect trust needs to weight the 
recommendations from other nodes depending on how much 
trusted they are [19, 20] or providing secret and confidential 
information with the recommendations [20]. The result of the 
exchange of recommendations for evaluating indirect trust is 
then spread through the whole cognitive radio network.  
Selfishness behavior and unwillingness attitude are the major 
drawbacks of the ‘indirect trust’ method to spread the 
information regarding reputation throughout the whole 
network. 
The functions and notations [16] that are involved in 
calculating the trust value for the trustor CR node ( i ) to the 
trustee CR node ( j ) in behavior-based trust frameworks is 
as follows: 
• A function ( , )DT i j for evaluating the direct 
trust value experienced from past interactions 
and based on network-based traffic monitoring 
metrics [16]. 
• A function ( , )IDT i j for evaluating the indirect 
trust value depending on recommendations from 
other neighboring CR nodes about the target 
node. 
• A function ( , )T i j for evaluating the final 
target trust value by using both direct and 
indirect trust.  This final trust ( ( , )T i j ) value 
is compared with the trust threshold for various 
purpose in the network.   
   
C. Trust Relationship 
Trust is defined as a mutual relationship between two 
entities for a specific action. Trust is defined by ‘T ’. The 
notation indicates the trust relationship between CR node A      
and CR node B .  If one CR node trusts another CR node for 
a specific purpose, a reliable trust relationship is established 
between these two communicating nodes. Let us assume that 
for two CR nodes where A is the primary user and B is the 
secondary user, the trust value of A to B is ABT .  If B sends 
a request to A to use its free spectrum, A checks whether it is 
good enough to assign the free spectrum to B.  If A does not 
have any past trust relationship with B, then A will evaluate 
the trust value using reference or recommendations which is 
called ‘Indirect Trust’. Whenever one node communicates, 
its activity is monitored and if it communicates successfully, 
its trust value is increased. 
D. Trust Factors in  CRNs 
In this section, we describe how different trust factors 
influence the trust management system in CRNs. 
We have described a set of different trust factors as follows: 
1) Trust and Reputation:  Trust and reputation should 
be calculated separately in the trust management 
system in CRNs. These values could be considered 
as input for determining the trust values.  
Sometimes trust is not calculated directly from the 
behavior of one node; then, it is better to consider 
the previous reputation in order to determine the 
trustworthiness of a node. For example, a malicious 
node could suddenly become good.  So it is not a 
wise decision to trust that malicious node, based on 
its previous reputation.  
2) Trust and Base Station: The base station should 
participate in the trust management system [18] in 
CRNs.  Both base stations (primary user base 
station, secondary user base station) use the 
information produced by the corresponding CR 
members in CRNs to observe, analyze the behavior 
of the CR nodes.  The base station stores the 
reputation value of the corresponding node and 
makes a global trust decision using these values.  
The correspondence between the base station and 
the CR nodes can be made by using secure 
communication mechanisms such as public key 
cryptography.  
3) Direct Information: The events performed by a 
certain CR node can be used as input for the trust 
management system in CRNs. Suppose node X has 
direct communication with node Y. So node X can 
measure trust value of node Y depending on the 
various events that it performed during their 
communication. Direct information should be taken 
into consideration during the development of the 
trust management system in CRNs. Trust 
information from different sources is more reliable 
when creating a robust trust system.  
4) Indirect Information:  Reputation-based information 
about all other nodes should be distributed among 
all the CRNs. So, one node can easily obtain 
information about other node which is not directly 
linked to that node.  For developing of trust 
management system, we should consider all indirect 
information carefully as failure to use indirect 
information may influence the result in decisions 
which are inconsistent with the CRNs.  
5) Initial values:  At the initial stage, the trust 
management system must set the initial values of 
trust and reputation of the network before the 
deployment.  At the initial stage of the deployment, 
all nodes must have a good reputation and be 
equally trusted [18]. At the very beginning of the 
deployment, any malicious adversary had neither 
the time nor the chance to influence or subvert a 
node [18]. New nodes that appear after the 
deployment should not be trusted as they might be 
adversarial or malicious. 
6) Degree of trust: For a better trust management 
system, the degree of trust during the calculation of 
trust and reputation of a CR node should be taken 
into consideration.  The reputation of a node 
depends on its past behavior and the actions 
performed by the node. 
7) Updating the trust value: The trust management 
system must be updated in a timely manner.  It is 
recommended that the trust value be checked at pre-
determined time intervals and that the previous trust 
management system is updated if necessary.   
8) Risk and importance : According to [18], there are 
two factors that influence the calculation of the trust 
values for a CR node, one is the risk of the 
interaction between the trustor and the trustee and 
the other is the importance of the reputation value in 
that specific interaction. Risk and importance also 
influence the selection of the trust threshold value 
for the CRNs.    
IV. COMBINATIONAL APPROACH FOR TRUST 
ESTABLISHMENT IN CRNS.  
 
In this section, we propose a combinational approach for 
establishing trust in CRNs which integrates the features of 
both certificate-based and behavior-based methods of 
establishing trust. The main objective and motivation of this 
approach is to reap the benefits of both methods. The pre-
deployment trust relationship is represented by certificate-
based trust establishment, and behavior-based trust is 




Fig 1: System model of Proposed Scheme 
 
In our proposed model, we want to show how trust 
establishment affects the model. 
The trust associations (TA) between any CR node i and any 
node j  in both networks work are as follows: 
1. Trust associations are stored in each CR node 
locally before deployment. 
2. A hierarchical trust relationship is established in 
the network so that CR node j is considered 
trusted by node i  . For example, if node j  has a 
valid certificate, node i  can verify its trust value 
based on the public key which is stored on trust 
managing authority (CA). Trust associations in the 
network can be measured between nodes that are 
associated with common trust managing authorities 
(CA) who is responsible to issue the certificates for 
a particular deployment. 
3. A cooperative process is established so that node i
asks for recommendations for node j from nodes 
with which node i  has a trust association. 
 
Certificate-based trust establishment: 
In our model, the primary user (PU) and secondary user 
(SU) are deployed in one geographical area. PUs are 
connected to PUBS (Primary User Base Station) and SUs 
are connected to SUBS (Secondary User Base Station). 
Both PUBS and SUBS are connected to the CA (Certificate 
Authority). In network security, the third party is called the 
Certificate Authority (CA) who always achieves secure 
authentication [10]. So the SUs and PUs are connected to 
CA via SUBS and PUBS respectively. Whenever one SU 
searches the PU’s free available spectrum, the PU is 
connected to the CA to see the trust value of the requested 
secondary user. The CA provides the trust-certificates to the 
Primary user about the requested secondary user.     
 
Behavior-based trust: 
When the PU wants to communicate with the SU, it 
searches the trust value of SU after receiving certificates 
from CA. If this SU has had previous interaction with this 
PU,   the PU will see the trust association table and check 
the trust value of SU for previous interactions. This is called 
‘direct trust’ ( ( , )DT i j ). 
If the PU does not have any previous communication with 
the SU, then it will use recommendations from other nodes 
about the SU. This is called ‘Indirect trust’ ( ( , )IDT i j ). If 
more than one neighboring node sends recommendations to 
the PU about SU. Then PU will obtain an average of these 
recommendations and  get at a trust value.  
The PU will calculate the final behavioral trust by 
integrating these two trust values in order to set up a 
communication link with the requesting node. 
( , ) D IDT i j T T= +  
The system will define a trust threshold ( ThresholdT ) 
depending on the system parameter.  After calculating the 
final trust, this value ( , )T i j is compared with the trust 
threshold value.  
If ( , ) ThresholdT i j T>  , then the requested service is 
provided to the requesting user.  
If ( , ) ThresholdT i j T< , then the requested service is 
discarded.  
The whole working process can be represented by the 
following process: 
In the first phase we want to show the interaction between 
sender and receiver. At first the sender sends one request to 









In this flowchart, we show how both certificate-based and 
behavior-based trust is established in CRNs. 
According to the system model, the working steps of this 
flowchart are as follows: 
1. One secondary user will send request to primary 
user to use its free spectrum after sensing algorithm 
applied. 
2. The primary user will receive the request from the 
secondary user and it will check the secondary 
user’s certificate from the CA for security 
purposes. If the CA does not send any valid 
certificate for this requesting secondary user, then 
the primary user will send this information to the 
base station. Then base station will detect whether 
it is a malicious node or a hacker. 
3. After checking the certificate, the primary user will 
check whether or not it has had any previous 
interaction the requesting secondary user. If it has 
any previous interaction, then it will calculate the 
trust value based on the previous event that the 
secondary user performed. Trust from this process 
is called ‘Direct Trust’.  
4. If the primary user has not had any previous 
interaction with the secondary user, then it will 
collect the recommendations from its neighboring 
nodes about the requesting secondary user. The 
primary user will accumulate the recommendations 
and calculate the trust value. Trust achieved in this 





Fig 3: Trust-based working process of Receiver 
 
5. The primary user will calculate the final trust. This 
trust value is compared with the trust threshold 
defined by the system based on the system 
parameters.  If the final trust is greater than the 
trust threshold, the requesting secondary user will 
obtain its requested service. 
6. If the final trust is less than the trust threshold, then 
the primary user will discard the request.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper is concerned with securing CRNs by establishing 
both behaviour-based and certificate-based trust in CRNs. 
Cognitive Radio Networks introduce various types of 
security attacks to wireless networks comparaed to wired 
networks and make the security models and approaches very 
crucial. Because of the dynamic characteristics of CRNs, a 
member of CRNs may join or leave the network at any time.  
So it is more imporatnt to ensure the security of CRNs than 
that of other conventional wireless networks. In this paper, 
we propose  a combination of certificate-based trust with a 
behavior-based trust which will benefit both by representing 
trust as certificates in  predeployment trust relationships  
and by providing a continuous behaviour-based evalution of 
trust. In our future work, we will focus on the detailed 
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